On the Coefficient of Variation as a Criterion for Decision under
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such environments might better be described as involving uncertainty rather than risk (Knight, 16 1921) . And different models of decision making might apply in environments characterized by 17 uncertainty than in environments characterized by risk. Weber et al. (pg. 443) , however, also 18 offered their model as a solution to the implausibility problems for expected utility theory that 19 follow from the concavity calibration critique that applies to theories of decision under risk 20 (Rabin 2000) . In response, we ask whether CV can provide either a credible normative criterion 21 for decision making under risk or a useful descriptive model of decisions under risk in two 22 experiments designed to test its distinctive properties. We also ask whether CV provides a useful 23 descriptive model of decisions in an experiment designed to test a concavity calibration 24 supposition (with described options) similar to the one discussed by Rabin (2000) ; this is a 25 direct response to claims made about the CV model by Weber et al.
26
Weber et al. (eq. 1, p. 433) write the utility of an option with random return X as a linear 1 function of the utility of its expected value, (EV( )) u X and its risk R ( ) X . They note that, for a 2 quadratic utility function, the measure of risk is the variance, Var ( ) X . They argue for use of the 3 dimension-invariant CV ( ) X , instead of Var ( ) X or SD ( ) X , as the measure of risk. 4
The CV measure only provides a measure of risk that is distinct from SD when it is 5 applied to distributions with distinct EVs. If application of CV were to be restricted to 6 comparisons across gambles with the same EV then it would produce a measure that was 7 identical to SD except for a scale factor. Thus we consider gambles with distinct EVs. Consider 8 two risky choice options with random returns, X and .
Y If for an individual j one has 9
10 then option Y is more likely to be chosen than option X by individual j (Weber et 
according to the CV measure of risk sensitivity,
20
where the last inequality follows from statement (  ). Hence the CV criterion implies that the 21 agent is more likely to choose option L 2 than option L 3 . But this conclusion is inconsistent with 
Therefore, weak preference for option C over option D implies that option J is more likely to be Before making their decisions, subjects were invited to inspect the die that would be 8 rolled to select which decision would be paid. They were shown the bingo cage containing balls 9 numbered 1,2,…, 10 that would be used to determine lottery payoffs. They were informed that,
10
after making their choices, they would be called one at a time to observe the die roll that would 11 select one of their six decision pages for payoff and that they would observe selection of a ball 12 from the bingo cage if they had chosen the lottery on the selected decision page. They were 13 informed that they would be invited to inspect the die and the contents of the bingo cage 14 immediately before these "urns" were used to determine an individual's payoff. and CVs of the risky lotteries are independent is not rejected. We also ran a linear regression of 10 the observed proportions of choices of the sure options on the CVs of the paired risky options.
15
11
The OLS-estimated coefficient for the CV variable is 0.043 (p-value is 0.591) and the constant is 
14
The Spearman test, the graphs in Figure 1 , and the linear regression use aggregate data.
15
Perhaps the effects of subject heterogeneity mask the effects of CV on individuals' willingness to 16 take risks. To address this question, we ran logit and probit regressions on individual data. The
17
Linear CV column of Table 2 for experiment 2 data reports estimates from a clustering logit 18 analysis of the data in which observations for each individual subject comprise a "group" of 19 observations. 
We follow common practice in applications of RD theory to data by using a parametric 4 model with probability transformation and utility of payoff functions given by 
10
The above inequality and the nature of payoffs and probabilities chosen in our 
12
We analyzed data at the individual level using logit amd probit estimators for the CV Nonlinear CV Model columns of Table 2 for data from the concavity calibration experiment 22 report estimates of b that are negative and insignificant whereas the CV model implies that they 23 should be significantly positive. We conclude that the CV criterion has no explanatory value for 1 data from the concavity calibration experiment. 
5
The RD Model column of Table 2 reports significantly positive estimates of  and r , as implied 6 by RD theory. We conclude that the RD model can rationalize data from the calibration 7 experiment whereas the CV model cannot.
9
Conclusion
10
We conclude that the CV criterion does not provide a credible normative criterion for decision 1. Let F and G be two cumulative probability distributions of payoffs defined on the set  . 4
Strict first order stochastic dominance of F over G (Hadar & Russell, 1969 ; Rothschild & 5 Stiglitz, 1970 ) is defined by: 
Therefore, in statement (a.2), we get that 19 20   Pr( ) ( ( 1) ) ( ( 1 ) ) Option I (which stands for "I don't care").
7
If you choose Option X (and Table 2 You will be paid an amount determined by your decisions in this experiment and the outcomes 6 from rolling a die and drawing a numbered ball from a bingo cage.
8
The experiment proceeds as follows. First, you choose your preferred option in each of six 9 tables. Second, which of the six tables will be selected for money payoff will be determined by 10 rolling a six-sided die in your presence. The number that ends "up" on the die determines which 11 one of your decision tables pays money.
13
Note that only one of your six decisions will be selected for money payoff by rolling the die; thus 14 you should decide which option you prefer in each 
Decision Pages 4 5
The response forms used in the experiment consist of six decision pages. Each decision 6 page contains one of the following tables, summary instructions for the choice task in the 7 table, and explanation of the lotteries on that page. Full text of the decision pages is 8 available upon request to the authors. The decision pages were given to individual 9 subjects in independently drawn random order. Subjects had access to all six decision 10 pages while making their decisions on every page. One decision page for each subject 11 was independently, randomly selected for money payoff. 12 13 
